In February 1940, as war engulfed Europe, President Franklin D. Roosevelt sent an unlikely diplomat to Ireland – his wife’s 70-year-old uncle who had never held a diplomatic position. David Gray’s mission would become one of the most challenging diplomatic assignments of World War II.
Gray arrived in Ireland (or Eire, as it was then called) with a diverse background. Prior to this appointment, he had enjoyed a successful career as a journalist, newspaper editor, practicing attorney, and novelist. Now largely retired, he brought no formal diplomatic training to his role as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, but he did possess a fondness for the country after multiple visits since 1933.
During his visits to Ireland, Gray particularly enjoyed the hunting and fishing opportunities available in the countryside. While he married into the Roosevelt family through his wife Maude Livingston Hall, the aunt of First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt, Gray was straightforward in his papers that this connection was instrumental to his appointment.
In 1940, the relationship between Eire and the U.S. was complicated. There were millions of Irish immigrants living in America and feelings of goodwill between people in both countries was strong. But Éamon de Valera, the prime minister (or Taoiseach) of Eire, was fiercely independent. On September 2nd, 1939, with World War II imminent, he had declared Eire to be in a state of emergency. The state of emergency gave sweeping powers to the government, including censorship of the press and correspondence and control of the economy. At the same time de Valera declared that Eire would remain neutral in any European war.
It was a popular position among the general population, although there were some factions in Eire that admired Germany, some Irish who rejected anything having to do with the British and some that believed Eire should support the Allies.
Once he arrived in Eire, Minister Gray discussed with de Valera their countries’ mutual positions of neutrality. (At that time, the U.S. had also technically adopted a position of neutrality.) About de Valera, Gray wrote, “I not only liked his country and his people, but I liked him.”
In June of 1940, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill told de Valera that the United Kingdom would push for Irish unity, under de Valera’s leadership, if Eire would abandon its position of neutrality and allow British use of ports in Eire. De Valera had long argued that Northern Ireland (which was part of the United Kingdom) and Eire should be united. But de Valera had turned down the offer, doubting that Churchill could deliver on his promise and fearing Eire would be flattened by a German attack. Despite de Valera’s official stance on neutrality, tens of thousands of Irish enlisted in the British Armed Forces to fight against the Germans.
As Gray’s diplomatic posting stretched into years, he maintained regular meetings with de Valera while corresponding with President Roosevelt twice monthly. De Valera came to Gray with requests – including asking him to lobby Roosevelt to provide American arms for Eire’s self-defense. Roosevelt remained noncommittal as de Valera continued to insist on neutrality.
Through their many meetings, Gray had come to believe that de Valera’s perspective on Irish neutrality could change if the U.S. entered World War II. But that was not to be the case. Churchill had, in secret, offered de Valera a second chance to denounce neutrality and join the Allies when it became evident that the U.S. would enter the war.
Shortly after the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor, de Valera gave a speech in Cork. In his remarks, he recounted the long history of friendship between Ireland and America but reiterated that Ireland “can only be a friendly neutral.”
Gray’s frustration with de Valera mounted. Gray wrote, “this very peculiar man … could be extremely hostile one minute and the next sympathetic, without trace of rancor.”
With the entry of the U.S. into World War II, Eire and Northern Ireland became even more strategically important. Geographically the two countries occupied a critical position. They were both the guardian of the eastern approach to Europe from the Atlantic as well as the western approach to Great Britain. Ports and airfields in Eire were strategic militarily.
Before long, the decision was made to station American troops in Northern Ireland. But the border between Eire and Northern Ireland was porous. American troops stationed in Northern Ireland could easily be spied upon. In fact, Allied intelligence services knew that German spy Herman Goertz was working out of Eire, where the Irish Republican Army (IRA) had helped him evade capture. Additionally, it was known that the German minister in Dublin had a secret radio transmitting set, which was being used to relay weather reports and information gathered by spies to the Nazis. As D-Day (the planned Allied invasion of Europe, beginning in Normandy, France) approached, there was an enhanced need to shut down German espionage in Eire. De Valera refused to cooperate.
De Valera objected to the stationing of American troops in Northern Ireland. Cordell Hull, the U.S. Secretary of State, responded, saying, “The decision to dispatch troops to the British Isles was reached in close consultation with the British Government as part of our strategic plan to defeat the Axis aggressors. There was not, and is not now, the slightest thought or intention of invading Irish territory or threatening Irish security.”
Gray continued to discuss with de Valera Eire’s position of neutrality and the Allies’ need for access to ports, airfields and naval bases in Eire. He also relayed President Roosevelt’s frustration with de Valera’s stance.
To the Americans, de Valera’s attitude made no sense. Eire was dependent on imports from Great Britain of coal, gasoline, wheat and medicine. Irish ships depended on British convoys when they crossed between Eire and Britain. And ironically, in May of 1941 German aircraft had even dropped bombs on Dublin, the capital of Eire. (The Germans claimed to have made a mistake, intending the attack to have been on Belfast in Northern Ireland. The Allies believed Germany was sending a warning to Eire.) Still, de Valera clung stubbornly to neutrality.
Gray wrote Roosevelt, encouraging him to implement an embargo on petroleum and other products to Eire and expressing Gray’s belief that Britain should do the same. Gray was determined to put pressure on de Valera. The friendship between the two men reached a new low. De Valera said to Gray, “You have never been able to understand the Irish point of view; often I would rather have had anyone else representing America than you.” Gray replied to de Valera, “The trouble is that you don’t understand that I am here to represent the American point of view and to try to make you understand it, in which I have always failed.”
From de Valera’s perspective, Eire largely escaped the devastation of German bombing campaigns by maintaining its neutrality. What remained of the relationship between de Valera and Gray dissipated further in 1945 when de Valera controversially visited the offices of the German ambassador in Dublin to offer his condolences on the death of Adolf Hitler. By July 1947, when Gray was finally recalled from his post in Dublin, seven years had passed, and World War II was over.
Upon his return to the U.S., Gray wrote about his experiences in Eire. Gray concluded that de Valera thought that Germany would win the war. De Valera kept Eire neutral in the hope that Northern Ireland and Eire would be reunited under his leadership if the Nazis won.
The David Gray papers at the American Heritage Center contain correspondence with Franklin D. Roosevelt, Eleanor Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, Éamon de Valera and many others. There are also manuscripts and research notes related to Ireland in World War II as well as various pamphlets and periodicals. Gray’s papers remind us of the complicated diplomatic realities that have shaped Irish-American relations.
Post contributed by AHC Writer Kathryn Billington.
